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In a Coalitional Resource Game (CRG for brief), agents form coali-
tions to pool their resources in order to achieve certain goals,
requiring the expenditure of these resources. A particular coalition
is said to be successful, if the common resources of its members
enable to achieve a set of goals that satisﬁes all members of the
coalition. It is known that when resources are consumable it is NP-
complete to decide whether a given coalition is successful. In this
paper, we show a connection of CRGs with sharable resources and
max–min linear systems of inequalities. This correspondence leads
to polynomial algorithms for checking whether a given CRG admits
a successful coalition and for several other problems whose coun-
terparts for CRGswith consumable resources are hard. On the other
hand, we prove that some problems concerning the structure of
successful coalitions are hard also in the case of sharable resources.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we study a ﬁrst application of the theory of max–min algebras in the theory of
cooperative games.
The ﬁrst game-theoretical models of cooperation of several agents studied mainly the questions
connected with the ways of sharing the proﬁt obtained by a common action of a group of agents
[7]. However, cooperation is quite often more of a qualitative character and proﬁt is not the main
motivation. A newmodel in this area, called the Coalitional Resource Game (CRG for short) was recently
introduced by Wooldridge and Dunne [10]. The authors assumed that agents cooperate with one
another so as to mutually accomplish their goals. Each goal requires the expenditure of a certain
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proﬁle of resources and hence an incentive for an agent to join a coalition is that he may not have
enough resources to achieve his goal. As an example, one may imagine collaborative science projects
where a number of agents cooperate by sharing sophisticated and expensive equipment, like particle
accelerators, super-computers, gene sequencers, etc. Machinery can be used by several agents or for
several different research projects (sharable resources), but the character of other resources is such that
as soon as one unit of them has been used for one purpose, it is no longer available for further projects.
Such resources are called consumable and examples of them are chemicals or biological material.
Wooldridge and Dunne [10] considered only games with consumable resources. They formulated
several decision problems associated with them and classiﬁed their complexity. For example, the
successful coalition problem, shown to be NP-complete, asks whether the pool of resources of the
members of a given coalition enables them to achieve a set of goals that satisﬁes all of them. Another
problem is necessary resource: is it possible that a coalition will achieve its goals without the use
of a given resource? This problem is co-NP-complete. The only decision problem shown in [10] to be
polynomially solvable for a CRGwith consumable resources was the potential goal set: given a set of
goals, does there exist a coalition such that this set of goals is both feasible and satisﬁes the coalition?
In this paper, we propose to formulate some problems for CRGs in the language of systems of linear
inequalities overmax–min algebra. In Section 2, we review the basic concepts of themax–min algebra,
in particular the necessary results known about solving ‘one-sided systems of linear equations’. Then
we derive a new solution method for special ‘two-sided systems’, needed for our study. Section 3
is devoted to the CRGs, in particular to ones with sharable resources. In Section 4, we show how to
formulate several decision problems for the CRG in the language ofmax–min linear systems and based
on this correspondence we derive polynomial algorithms for them. Finally, Section 5 brings hardness
proofs of some other problems.
2. Linear systems in max–min algebra
Max–min algebra is a tripleM = (R,⊕,⊗)where R is a linearly ordered setwith theminimumand
maximum elements denoted by 0 and 1, operations ⊕ = maximum and ⊗ = minimum. (By conven-
tion, theminimumof an empty set will be equal to 1.) Max–min algebra, as a special type of a semiring
[1], was introduced to model problems connected with discrete dynamic systems, synchronisation,
fuzzy reasoning, etc.
In this paper, we shall take R to be equal either to the set R+ of nonnegative reals appended by
∞, or to the two-element Boolean algebra B = {0, 1}. The symbol R+(n, m) represents the set of all
n × m matrices with nonnegative real entries. The set of all nonnegative real vectors R+(n, 1) will
be denoted by R+n . We use B(n, m) and Bn for binary matrices and vectors and M(n, m) and Mn
for matrices and vectors over a general max–min algebra. We denote matrices by capitals, vectors by
boldface letters and their entries by simple letters.
Given a set of vectors S ⊆ Mn, a vector x ∈ S is said to bemaximum, if y  x holds (componentwise)
for all y ∈ S and it ismaximal if y = x for each vector y ∈ S fulﬁlling x  y.
Operations ⊕ and ⊗ are extended to operations with matrices similarly as in the classical algebra.
More precisely, for two compatible matrices A of type m × n and B of type n × p their (classical)
product, denoted by AB, is a matrix C of typem × p such that
cij =
n∑
k=1
aikbkj.
On the other hand, the max–min product of matrices A and B will be denoted by A ⊗ B = C, where
cij =
n⊕
k=1
aik ⊗ bkj.
The basic properties of max–min linear systems of inequalities were formulated and rediscovered
bymany authors during the last few decades; among the ﬁrst oneswere Sanchez [8] and Zimmermann
in a research report written in Czech in 1976 [11]:
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Theorem 1. Let A ∈ M(m, n), b ∈ Mm be given. The maximum solution of inequality
A ⊗ x  b (1)
is equal to a vector x∗(A, b) whose entries are
x∗j (A, b) = min{bi; aij > bi}. (2)
Theorem 2. Let A ∈ M(m, n), C ∈ M(k, n), b ∈ Mm, d ∈ Mk. The system of max–min inequalities of
the form
A ⊗ x  b, (3)
C ⊗ x  d (4)
is solvable if and only if vector x∗(A, b) fulﬁlls inequality (4). Moreover, x∗(A, b) is the maximum solution
of this system.
Proof. The ‘if’ implication is trivial. For the converse direction let us suppose that y is such that A ⊗
y  b and C ⊗ y  d. Then y  x∗(A, b) hence C ⊗ x∗(A, b) d. Maximality is implied by
Theorem 1. 
Notice that since vector x∗(A, b) can be computed in O(mn) time for a given matrix A ∈ M(m, n)
and a given right-hand side b ∈ Mm, solvability of system (3)–(4) can be decided in polynomial time.
A two-sided system of the form
A ⊗ x  B ⊗ y, (5)
C ⊗ x D ⊗ y (6)
for A ∈ M(m, n), B ∈ M(m, p), C ∈ M(k, n), D ∈ M(k, p) with unknowns x ∈ Mn and y ∈ Mp
always has a trivial, i.e. zero solution, however, an efﬁcient algorithm to ﬁnd nontrivial solutions has so
far not been published. Methods for general systems e.g. from [4,5,9], could be used, however, none of
them is polynomial. For two-sided linear systems over a similar structure, called max-algebra where
operation ⊗ is the classical addition, polynomial algorithms have recently been proposed in [3,2].
In this work shall need max–min systems of a special form,
A ⊗ x  B ⊗ y, (7)
C ⊗ x  y, (8)
Input:Matrices A ∈ B(p, n), B ∈ B(p, m), C ∈ B(m, n).
Output: Vectors x ∈ Bn, y ∈ Bm such that A ⊗ x ≤ B ⊗ y and C ⊗ x ≥ y.
begin k := 0; yk = (1, . . . , 1)T ;
repeat xk := x∗(A, B ⊗ yk); Ik := {i; (C ⊗ xk)i < yki };
if Ik /= ∅ then begin yk+1i :=
{
0 if i ∈ Ik
yki otherwise
;
k := k + 1;
end
until Ik = ∅
end
Fig. 1. Algorithm 1.
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where in addition, all the matrices as well as unknown vectors x and y are required to be binary. Let
us consider Algorithm 1 given in Fig. 1.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 correctly decides in O(m(pn + pm + mn)) time whether system (7)–(8) has a
nontrivial binary solution. Moreover, the found solution is a maximum solution of (7)–(8).
Proof. As in each repeat-until loop with Ik /= ∅ at least one entry of yk is switched from 1 to 0, we
have at most m loops. In each loop, the computation of x∗(A, B ⊗ yk) needs O(pn + pm) steps, and
C ⊗ xk can be computed in O(mn) time. Hence the time bound follows.
To prove the correctness, denote by S the solution set of (7) and (8). Then notice that for each
(x, y) ∈ S , one has (x, y)(x0, y0). For the induction assumption take the following assertion:
If Ik−1 /= ∅, then (x, y)(xk, yk) for each (x, y) ∈ S .
By construction, A ⊗ xk  B ⊗ yk . If Ik = ∅, then (xk, yk) already is a solution. If not, interpreting
C ⊗ xk as a constant right-hand side for (8) and using Theorem 1, we get that any solution (xk, y) ∈ S
fulﬁlls y  yk+1. Then, taking B ⊗ yk+1 as a constant right-hand side for (7), again Theorem 1 implies
that x  xk+1 for each (x, yk+1) ∈ S . Hence, if Ik /= ∅ then (x, y)(xk+1, yk+1) for each (x, y) ∈ S . 
3. Coalitional Resource Games
Deﬁnition 1. An instance of a Coalitional Resource Game (CRG for short) is a six-tuple Γ = (A, G,R,
D, E, T), where
• A = {a1, . . . , am} is the set of agents,• G = {g1, . . . , gn} is the set of goals,• R = {r1, . . . , rp} is the set of resources,• D ∈ B(m, n) is the desires matrix, with
dij =
{
1 if agent i wishes to achieve goal j,
0 otherwise,
• E ∈ R+(p, m) is the endowments matrix, with eki representing the quantity of resource k agent i
is endowed with,
• T ∈ R+(p, n) is the technology matrix, with tkj representing the quantity of resource k needed to
achieve goal j.
Deﬁnition 2. For a nonempty coalition Y ⊆ A we say that a set of goals X is satisfying, if for each
ai ∈ Y there exists a goal gj ∈ X such that dij = 1. The family of all satisfying sets of goals for a
given coalition Y will be denoted by D(Y). A set of goals X is feasible for a given nonempty coalition
Y ⊆ A, if coalition Y has enough resources to achieve each goal from X . The family of all feasible
sets of goals for a given coalition Y will be denoted by F(Y). A coalition Y is said to be successful, if
D(Y) ∩ F(Y) /= ∅.
Similarly as in [10], we suppose that each agent iwishes to achieve any goal from the set Gi = {gj ∈
G; dij = 1}, he is indifferent between them and obtains no extra utility from achieving more than one
goal.
Deﬁnition 3. Resource rk is called consumable, if any unit of it used for one goal, cannot be used for
another one. A CRG is called a CRG with consumable resources, if each resource rk ∈ R is consumable.
Resource rk is called sharable, if its expenditure can contribute to multiple goals that require rk . A CRG
is called a CRG with sharable resources, if each resource rk ∈ R is sharable. A CRG is called binary, if all
the entries of matrices E and T are either 0 or 1.
In what follows, we shall assume that all the considered CRGs with sharable resources are binary,
i.e. each goal either requires a particular resource or not and similarly, a particular agent either owns
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the resource or not. Further, we shall also suppose that a feasible goal is available to all members of a
particular successful coalition, i.e. that all goals are ‘sharable’ in the sense that their availability by the
members of a coalition is not dependent on the number of its agents.
Example 1. Let us consider a CRG with three agents, two goals and four consumable resources, i.e.
m = 3, n = 2 and p = 4. The desires, endowment and technology matrices are as follows:
D =
⎛
⎝1 11 0
0 1
⎞
⎠ , E =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 1 1
2 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ , T =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
3 0
0 2
0 1
1 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
For this CRG no successful coalition exists, as we now show.
• If a coalition does not contain agent a3, it is deemed to be unsuccessful, as each goal requires
resource r4 with which only agent a3 is endowed.• Any coalition containing agent a3 must achieve goal g2 to satisfy him. However, this goal requires
2 units of resource r2, which only agent a1 has and 1 unit of resource r3, that is owned only by
agent a2. Hence, the only possibility is the grand coalition. However, coalition Y = {a1, a2, a3}
must achieve both goals, for which 2 units of resource r4 are needed. As all agents together have
only 1 unit of this resource, the grand coalition is not successful.
Example 2. In this example, we shall suppose that the resources are sharable. Let againm = 3, n = 2
and p = 4. We take binary matrices
D =
⎛
⎝1 11 0
0 1
⎞
⎠ , E =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 1 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ , T =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 0
0 1
0 1
1 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
Similarly as before, any successful coalition must contain agent a3 (because of resource r4) and then
also agents a1 and a2 to ensure the availability of resources r2 and r3 for goal g2. But now the grand
coalition is successful (the only successful coalition in this game), as it has all the necessary resources
to achieve both goals. Further, it is easy to see that the only satisfying and feasible goal set for the grand
coalition is G itself and that this coalition needs all the resources for its success.
If one uses just deﬁnitions, then checking whether a given coalition is successful may in general
require to consider all the possible subsets of G, so the hardness results of [10] are not a very great
surprise. However, the intractability does not carry over to the case with sharable resources. In the
following section we shall obtain polynomial algorithms for several problems formulated for such
CRGs using their relation with max–min linear systems.
Instead of coalition Y ⊆ A we shall often take its characteristic vector y = (y1, . . . , ym)T ∈ Bm
deﬁned by yi = 1 if ai ∈ Y and yi = 0 otherwise. Similarly, a set of goals X ⊆ G is represented by its
characteristic vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)T ∈ Bn with xj = 1 if gj ∈ X and xj = 0 otherwise.
4. CRGs and max–min linear systems
Our ﬁrst considered decision problems are:
successful coalition
Instance: CRG Γ and a nonempty coalition Y ⊆ A.
Question: Is Y successful?
successful coalition existence
Instance: CRG Γ with sharable resources.
Question: Does there exist a successful coalition Y ⊆ A?
We show the connection between these two problems and systems of linear inequalities.
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Theorem 4. Let Γ be a CRG with consumable resources and Y ⊆ A a nonempty coalition. Coalition Y is
successful if and only if there exists a vector x ∈ Bn such that
D ⊗ x  y, (9)
Tx  Ey. (10)
Proof. Realize that the ith inequality in (9) says
max
j=1,2,...,nmin{dij, xj} yi,
which can be reworded in the following way: if agent ai belongs to coalition Y , then there exists a goal
gj ∈ X , which this agent desires. On the other hand, the kth inequality in (10) says
n∑
j=1
tkjxj 
m∑
i=1
ekiyi,
hence its left-hand side counts the amount of resource rk needed to achieve all the goals in X and
the right-hand side expresses the amount of resource rk that coalition Y owns in common. Hence
altogether, inequality (10) expresses that coalition Y has enough resources to bring about the set of
goals X . 
Wooldridge and Dunne [10] showed that successful coalition is an NP-complete problem for
binary CRG with consumable resources. (Notice that a polynomial algorithm for a system of the form
(9)–(10) is not known.) For CRGs with sharable resources there is a connection of successful coalitions
and ‘pure’ max–min linear systems of inequalities.
Theorem 5. Let Γ be a CRG with sharable resources and Y ⊆ A a nonempty coalition. Coalition Y is
successful if and only if there exists a vector x ∈ Bm such that for the characteristic vectors x and y the
following holds:
D ⊗ x  y, (11)
T ⊗ x  E ⊗ y. (12)
Proof. Themeaning of inequality (11) is the same as in Theorem 4. The kth inequality in (12) now says
max
j=1,2,...,nmin{tkj, xj} maxi=1,2,...,mmin{eki, yi},
hence the left-hand side is equal to 1 if and only if some goal in set X requires resource rk and its
right-hand side is equal to 1 if and only if at least one member of coalition Y owns this resource.
Summing up, inequality (12) ensures that coalition Y has all resources needed to achieve the set of
goals X . 
As for a given coalition Y the right-hand sides in (11) and (12) are constant vectors, using
Theorem 2 we have
Corollary 1. The successful coalition problem for CRG with sharable resources can be decided in poly-
nomial time.
For the successful coalition existence problem Theorem 5 still applies, but the right-hand sides of
inequalities (11) and (12) are no longer constants. So we have a two-sided system of max–min linear
inequalities of the form considered in Section 2 and we can use Algorithm 1.
Theorem 6. An instance of successful coalition existence is a ‘yes’ instance if and only if the cor-
responding system (11)–(12) with unknowns x and y has a nontrivial solution. Hence, this problem is
polynomial.
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A converse scenario can also be thought of. Suppose that a central body (say a government) is
interested in a number of research projects, which could be pursued by various research groups
(universities, faculties or research institutes). However, the research groups are autonomous in the
sense that theywill choose independently from the central bodywhich projects to pursue andwhether
to cooperatewith other research groups. Could there exist a consortiumof the existing research groups,
able andwilling to accomplish all the intended research projects? This leads to the following problem.
potential goal set
Instance: CRG Γ , a set of goals X ⊆ G.
Question: Is there a coalition Y ⊆ A such that X ∈ F(Y) ∩ D(Y)?
Theorem 7. potential goal set problem is polynomially solvable for each CRG with sharable resources.
Proof. A set X is a potential goal set if and only if the system of max–min linear inequalities (11)–(12)
with vector x being the characteristic vector of the set X and unknown vector y is solvable. As this is a
one-sided max–min linear system, potential goal set is polynomially solvable. 
The following problems deal with resources.
necessary resource for coalition
Instance: CRG Γ , successful coalition Y ⊆ A, resource rk ∈ R.
Question: Is resource rk necessary for Y , i.e. is (T ⊗ x)k > 0 for each set of goals
X ∈ D(Y) ∩ F(Y)?
necessary resource
Instance: CRG Γ and resource rk ∈ R.
Question: Is resource rk necessary for success, i.e. is (T ⊗ x)k > 0 for each successful
coalition Y ⊆ A and for each set of goals X ∈ D(Y) ∩ F(Y)?
Theorem 8. Let Γ be a CRG with sharable resources, Y ⊆ A a nonempty coalition and rk a resource.
Coalition Y is successful and resource rk is necessary for Y if and only if system (11)–(12) is solvable, but
not the following system:
D ⊗ x  y, (13)
T ⊗ x  E ⊗ y, (14)
(T ⊗ x)k  0. (15)
Proof. Inequalities (13) and (14) ensure that Y is a successful coalition. Hence when (13)–(15) is
not solvable, then it is because for no set of goals X ∈ D(Y) ∩ F(Y) the use of resource rk can be
avoided. 
Corollary 2. Problems necessary resource as well as necessary resource for coalition for CRG with
sharable resources are polynomial.
5. Hard problems
Although the existence of a successful coalition for a CRG with sharable resources can be decided
in polynomial time, a complete description of the structure of all successful coalitions will not be so
easy, as the following two problems are hard:
successful coalition splitting
Instance: CRG Γ with sharable resources, successful coalition Y ⊆ A.
Question: Is it possible to split Y into two successful subcoalitions?
minimum cardinality successful coalition
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Instance: CRG Γ with sharable resources, an integer k.
Question: Does Γ admit a successful coalition containing at most k agents?
Theorem 9. The successful coalition splitting problem is NP-complete.
Proof. This problem is in the class NP, due to Corollary 1. To prove completeness, we shall construct a
polynomial transformation from the following NP-complete problem [6, Problem SP4]:
set splitting
Instance: A collection C of subsets of a ﬁnite set S.
Question: Is it possible to split S into two subsets S1, S2 in such a way that S1 ∩ C /= ∅ as
well as S2 ∩ C /= ∅ for each C ∈ C?
So let (S, C) be an instance of set splitting. In the corresponding CRG Γ there will be one agent ai for
each element si ∈ S and one resource rj for each Ci ∈ C. Agent ai owns precisely those resources rj for
which si ∈ Cj . There is just one goal g and it requires all resources.
Clearly, the grand coalition Y = A is successful in Γ . Moreover, Y can be split into two successful
coalitions if and only if (S, C) is a yes-instance of set splitting. 
Theorem 10. minimum cardinality successful coalition problem is NP-complete.
Proof. Thanks to Corollary 1, this problem is in the class NP. Nowwe construct a polynomial transfor-
mation from Problem SP8 of [6]:
hitting set
Instance: A collection C of subsets of a ﬁnite set S, an integer k.
Question: Does there exist a subset S′ ⊆ S such that |S′| k and S ∩ C /= ∅ for each C ∈ C?
Let (S, C, k) be an instance of hitting set, let us deﬁne an instance (Γ , k) of minimum cardinality
successful coalition as follows: there will be one agent ai for each element si ∈ S, one resource rj for
each set Cj ∈ C and one goal g, requiring all resources. Moreover, we suppose that each agent ai owns
precisely those resources rj for which si ∈ Cj . It is trivial to see that a coalition Y is successful if and
only if the corresponding subset S′ = {si ∈ S; ai ∈ Y} is a hitting set. 
6. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to present a new application of the well established theory of max–min
linear inequalities in the cooperative game theory. We tried to complement the work presented in
[10] by concentrating on Coalitional Resource Games with sharable resources. As far as we know, such
gameshavenot been considered in literature yet.We revealed the relation of several decision problems
for these games and systems ofmax–min linear inequalities. This correspondence enabled us to derive
easily polynomial algorithms for problems whose counterparts are hard for CRGs with consumable
resources.
Notice that in the considered model we do not assume that the resources, although sharable, can
be accessed only sequentially, like it is the case with most equipment examples given in Section 1.
The difﬁculty is that in such a case the resource in fact looses its shareability and one has to consider
instead ‘machine time’ that is already consumable. So we believe that this assumption will spoil the
polynomiality rendered by the correspondence between CRGs with sharable resources and max–min
linear systems and for such models other approaches will be more suitable.
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